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The New Ohio Municipal Court Act
ROBERT L. WnLs*
The new municipal court act is a milestone in the development
of the Ohio judicial system. It was necessary to overcome many
obstacles and to resolve many conflicting interests in order to make
its enactment possible. A high degree of uniformity has been at-
tained. The statute is well drafted. Provisions which may require
amendment are relatively minor. They appear to be surprisingly
few, in view of the number and complexity of the problems involved.
The sponsors of the Act wisely avoided the inclusion of detailed
procedural provisions. Such matters can be dealt with more ef-
fectively in the light of experience under the statute. The Act
marks a long step forward in the improvement of the administra-
tion of justice in the municipal courts, where many citizens have
their only contact with the machinery of the law.
HISTORY
Beginning in 1910, with the establishment of the Municipal
Court of Cleveland, the Ohio Legislature had established, by sepa-
rate acts, thirty-nine municipal courts. Although the provisions of
the various acts were parallel in many respects, the number of
divergences was substantial. As a result, the interpretation of a
provision of one municipal court act would frequently afford little
guidance to the interpretation of provisions of other municipal
court acts. The existence of separate municipal court acts created
legislative drafting problems in connection with the establishment
of a new municipal court. In the preparation of a new separate
municipal court act, it was often the practice to include provisions
from different existing acts, rather than to follow one existing act
completely. The amendment of existing acts had a tendency to in-
crease the number of divergences between acts.'
Such considerations led to the advocacy of a uniform municipal
court act. In 1949, the 98th General Assembly passed a bill, known
as Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 145, which would have
constituted a uniform municipal court act.2 However, it was vetoed
by the Governor on July 28, 1949, largely because in his opinion
*Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1 The disadvantages of the system of separate municipal court acts were
discussed comprehensively by Judge Robert L. McBride of the Municipal
Court of Dayton in two published addresses, Unification. of Ohio Municipal
Courts, 22 Omo BAR 619 (Jan. 30, 1950), and Municipal Court Refor'm is Neces-
sary, 23 OHio BAr 679 (Nov. 27, 1950).
2 The bill was originally drafted by the Bureau of Code Revision at the
instance of the Legislature. Senate Joint Resolution 17, 97th General Assem-
bly, 122 Ohio Laws 767 (1947).
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the bill failed to achieve substantially the goal of uniformity. A
new bill, House Bill No. 658, 98th General Assembly, was drafted
to meet the Governor's objections and introduced near the close
of the session. It passed the House with the Governor's endorse-
ment and commendation, but when it reached the Senate, there
were not sufficient Senators present to suspend the rules and pass
it.
On November 4, 1950, the Council of Delegates of the Ohio
State Bar Association approved a bill for submission to the 99th
General Assembly. This bill was substantially the same as House
Bill No. 658, 98th General Assembly.3
The bill was introduced as Senate Bill No. 14 by Senator Mar-
shall of Franklin County in the 99th General Assembly. It was
given intensive consideration in the Judiciary Committees of both
houses, and many suggestions were received. As a result, a con-
siderable number of amendments were adopted, making a sub-
stitute bill necessary. The substitute bill, as amended, was passed
by both houses, approved by the Governor on June 13, 1951, and
filed in the office of the Secretary of State on June 14, 1951.4
EFFE CTmE DATE
The Act s was declared to be an emergency measure, and to
go into immediate effect, in order to afford the opportunity to elect
judges for the newly established municipal courts at the general
election in 1951.6 However, the general provisions of the Act do
not go into effect until January 1, 1952. Section 2 of the Act pro-
vides that the existing municipal court act sections are repealed
as of December 31, 1951. The present jurisdiction and procedure
of the existing municipal courts therefore continue unchanged un-
til that date.7 Thus, an interim period is established during which
the practice of the existing municipal courts may be adjusted to
the provisions of the new law.
EsTABLismimT OF MuNIcIPAL COURTS
Section 1581 of the General Code establishes a municipal court
3 The discussion herein of the history of this legislation is based in part
on the article, Proposed Uniform Municipal Court Act, 23 Oaro BAR 721 (Dec.
25, 1950), which contains the text of the recommended bill.
4 Although the law is sometimes referred to as the "Uniform Municipal
Court Act," the word "uniform" was deleted from the title by amendment.
s Amended Senate Bill No. 14 will hereinafter be referred to as "the Act."6 The nomination and election of judges of municipal courts under the
Act is discussed in Opinion No. 535 of the Attorney General of Ohio, rendered
July 14, 1951. The election and appointment of clerks of municipal courts
under the Act is discussed in Opinion No. 705 of the Attorney General of
Ohio, rendered September 4, 1951.
7 Omo GEN. CODE § 1617.
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in each of fifty-five alphabetically enumerated municipal corpor-
ations. Sixteen of these courts are newly created by the Act. In
the future, a new municipal court may be created simply by (1)
adding the name of the new municipal corporation to the enumer-
ation in this section, (2) providing for the terms and times of elec-
tion of judges in Section 1588, and (3) providing for additional
territorial jurisdiction in Section 1582, if so desired.
TEmRToRY
The term "territory" is frequently used in the Act. It is defined
in Section 1583 of the General Code as the "geographical areas
within which municipal courts have jurisdiction as provided in Sec-
tions 1581 and 1582." The territory of the municipal court always
includes the area comprised within the corporate limits of the
municipal corporation. Section 1582 provides for additional ter-
ritorial jurisdiction in the case of a number of municipal courts.
JUDGES
Section 1585 of the General Code provides for the number of
municipal court judges, which is based on the population of the
territory of the particular municipal court.
Section 1587 provides that all municipal court judges, includ-
ing chief justices, shall be elected for terms of six years.8
Section 1590 contains an interesting provision for the appoint-
ment of an "acting judge" when a judge of a municipal court hav-
ing only one judge is temporarily absent or incapacitated.
The compensation of municipal judges under the Act is fixed
by Section 1591, and the compensation of newly-elected judges
would be governed by the Act. There are certain municipal judges
whose terms do not expire this year. Sections 1588 and 1617 clear-
ly provide that the existing terms of municipal judges shall not
be affected by the Act. It must be assumed that it was the legis-
lative intent that the salaries of such judges should continue un-
changed, as an attempt to change their salaries would violate Article
II, Section 20 of the Ohio Constitution, prohibiting any change in
the salary of any officer during his existing term.
CHIEF JUSTICES AND PRESIDING JUDGES
"In a municipal court having twelve or more judges, one of
such judges shall be designated as a chief justice, who shall be
8 Article IV, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides that "all judges,
other than those provided for in this constitution, shall be elected .... but
not for a longer term of office than five years." However, Article XVII, Sec-
tion 2 provides that the term of office of judges other than those mentioned
therein "shall be such even number of years not exceeding six (6) years as
may be prescribed by the general assembly."
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elected as such. .. ."9 The Municipal Court of Cleveland will be
the only municipal court which will have a chief justice.
"In a municipal court having three to eleven judges, the pre-
siding judge shall be selected by the respective judges of said court
on the second Monday in January of the even numbered years."10
The judge so selected would not have been elected as a presiding
judge. However, Section 1591 provides that "the presiding judge
of a municipal court shall receive an additional five hundred dol-
lars...." As the selection of the presiding judge, and his conse-
quent increase in salary, would take place during his term of of-
fice, the question may be raised as to whether such increase would
violate Article H, Section 20 of the Ohio Constitution, supra."
"In a municipal court having two judges, the judge whose term
next expires shall be designated as the presiding judge."'" A similar
constitutional question may arise as to the additional compensation
of such a presiding judge, although the automatic method of selec-
tion would perhaps be a basis for distinction.
The relationship of the judges of a multi-judge municipal court
is further regulated by Sections 1600 and 1601.
MAXMIUM PECUNIARY LIMITATION ON JUMSDICTION
Section 1593 of the General Code provides that a municipal
court shall have original jurisdiction in cases where the amount
claimed by any party, or the value of personal property sought to
be recovered, does not exceed $2,000.00. (An exception is made in
the case of the Municipal Court of Cleveland, in which the maxi-
mum is $5,000.00.) This represents an increase in the maximum
jurisdiction of most municipal courts. The effect of this jurisdic-
tional limitation on counterclaims is discussed infra. Section
1602 (F) provides that "when the amount due either party exceeds
the sum for which a municipal court is authorized to enter judg-
ment, such party may in writing remit the excess and judgment
[may?] be entered for the residue."
9 Oro GEN. CODE § 1589.
10 Ibid.
11 In State ex rel. Mack v. Guckenberger, 139 Ohio St. 273, 39 N.E. 2d 840
(1942), it was held that a statute, effective before the commencement of the
term of a common pleas judge whereby his compensation is automatically
increased during his term by reason of the increase in the population of his
county, is not in conflict with Article IV, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.
Even if the principle of this case is applicable to newly elected municipal
judges, it could hardly be contended that it is applicable to municipal judges
elected prior to June 13, 1951, the effective date of the Act, whose terms con-
tinue beyond January 1, 1952.
12 OHIo GEN. CODE § 1589.
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ORIGINAL CIVIL JURisDIcTIoN WrrHm TE RTY Am
WrrmN COUNTY
Although the municipal court is a court of record, it is not a
court of general jurisdiction, and therefore has only such jurisdic-
tion as may be conferred by law. Civil jurisdiction is conferred on
the municipal court by Sections 1594 and 1595 of the General Code,
subject to the $2,000.00 maximum established by Section 1593.
Section 1594 provides for the jurisdiction of a municipal court with-
in its territory, and Section 1595 provides for the jurisdiction of a
municipal court within the county or counties in which its territory
is situated. The county wide jurisdiction is narrower in scope than
the jurisdiction within the territory.
(1) Civil Jurisdiction Within Territory
Section 1594 of the General Code, providing for the civil juris-
diction of the municipal court within its territory, conforms rather
closely to the provisions of most of the old separate municipal
court acts. Important exceptions are made as to the municipal
court of Cleveland.
(2) Civil Jurisdiction Within County
Section 1595 of the General Code, providing for the civil juris-
diction of the municipal court within the county, contains several
provisions which were found in most of the old separate municipal
court acts. However, certain provisions deserve particular men-
tion.
Sub-section (D) of Section 1595 confers county wide jurisdic-
tion on the municipal court "in any civil action or proceeding at
law in which the subject matter of the action or proceeding is lo-
cated within the territory or when the defendant or some one of
the defendants resides or is served with summons within the terri-
tory." Thus, if there are two defendants, and Defendant 1 is served
within the territory, and Defendant 2 is served outside the territory
but within the county, the municipal court has jurisdiction, under
sub-section (D). If Defendant 2 cannot be served within the coun-
ty, the case does not come within sub-section (D), but it would
seem that the court could acquire jurisdiction of Defendant 2 by
issuing summons to the sheriff of his county under Section 1603.
As in the case of most procedural legislation, the Act does not
purport to distinguish between the following concepts: (1) juris-
diction of the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant; and (3) venue. Therefore, the usual venue-jurisdiction
confusion may be anticipated.'3
13 See Wills, The Effect of Improper Venue Upon Jurisdiction of the Per-
son and Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter, 11 Omo ST. L. J. 291 (1950), and
Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 Mic. L. lrv. 307
(1951).
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Sub-section (E) of Section 1595 confers county wide jurisdic-
tion on the municipal court "in all civil actions for the recovery of
money only where the amount claimed by the plaintiff exceeds
the exclusive jurisdiction of justices of the peace.' 4 This would
seem to permit a suit for $100.01 or more against a defendant who
is served within the county but outside the territory. However,
if there are two defendants, and Defendant 1 is served within the
county but outside the territory, and Defendant 2 is outside the
county, Section 1603 does not permit the issuance of summons to
his county, as such issuance is restricted to cases in which, inter
alia, ". . . a defendant.., is served with summons within said ter-
ritory... ." (Emphasis supplied.) It is questionable whether Sec-
tion 11282 would justify service on Defendant 2 in this situation.
Sub-section (H) of Section 1595 confers county wide jurisdic-
tion on the municipal court "in any action for injury to person or
property caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, as
provided by Sections 6308 and 6308-1 of the General Code." Ap-
parently the effect of this sub-section is that if an injury to person
or property is caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle
within the county, an action for such injury may be brought in a
municipal court in the county. Summons may be issued to the
sheriff of another county, or, if the defendant is a non-resident of
the state, service may be made under the non-resident motorist
statutes.13
PRAcTicE Am Pnocmux In Civm AcTIoNs
Sections 1597 and 1599 of the General Code, construed togeth-
er, in effect provide that practice and procedure in civil actions in
the municipal court shall be controlled (1) by the Act itself; (2) if
no provision in the Act is applicable, by common pleas court statutes;
(3) if neither, then by justice of the peace statutes; (4) if none of
the foregoing, by local rule of court. Thus, in a forcible entry and
detainer action, any matter which is not covered by the Act itself
would be controlled by justice of the peace statutes, as no proce-
dure is provided for such actions in the court of common pleas.
14 Thus, in most actions, when the amount claimed is between $100.01 and
$300.00, both inclusive, the court of common pleas, the municipal court, and
the justice of the peace have concurrent jurisdiction. While this may result
in some cases being filed in the municipal court rather than with the justice
of the peace, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, out-
side the territory of the municipal court, is left unchanged. For example, in
an action on an account for less than $100.01, if the defendant may be served
only in the county outside the territory, the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace is exclusive.
Is Omo GEN. CODE § 6308-1 et seq.
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(1) Commencement of Actions
Section 1602 of the General Code provides that actions in the
municipal court "shall be commenced by filing a petition upon
which summons shall be issued by the clerk." Thus, so far as the
Act is concerned, it is unnecessary to file a precipe for the issuance
of summons. This provision is similar to Rules 3 and 4 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. It is likely that local rules of court
will be adopted as to the manner of indicating to the clerk the type
of service desired by the plaintiff.
Thus, the commencement of an action in municipal court dif-
fers from the commencement of an action in the court of common
pleas. Section 11279 of the General Code, governing procedure in
the court of common pleas, provides:
A civil action must be commenced by filing in the office of
the clerk of the proper court a petition, and causing a sum-
mons to be issued thereon.
By reason of the wording of Section 1602 it would seem that upon
the filing of the petition in municipal court, the action is com-
menced for any purpose for which a special rule has not been es-
tablished. Thus, upon the filing of the petition, the action is prob-
ably commenced within the meaning of Section 11819, which pro-
vides that "in a civil action for the recovery of money, at or after
its commencement, the plaintiff may have an attachment .... " (Em-
phasis supplied.) However, there would ordinarily be no reason
why the plaintiff's attorney could not make certain that summons
had been issued before obtaining an attachment. This should avoid
any question as to whether the attachment was premature.16
A special rule, however, has long been established as to when
an action is commenced for the purpose of tolling the statute of
limitations. This rule is set forth in Sections 11230 and 11231 of
the General Code. In view of the second paragraph of Section
1599, this special rule is probably applicable to the municipal court.
16 In Consumers Plumbing and Heating Supply Co. v. Chicago Pottery Co.,
155 Ohio St. 373, 98 N.E. 2d 823 (1951), the court held that within the purview
of Section 11819 of the General Code, "an action is commenced when a peti-
tion is filed in the proper court and a summons issued thereon." The court
rejected the argument that the attachment was premature because it was issued
prior to the date of the first publication of notice in constructive service. Al-
though the case involved an action against a foreign corporation upon which
personal service could not be had within the state, the unqualified language
of the first paragraph of the syllabus indicates that it would not be restricted
to such a situation. It is to be hoped that the decision indicates that the trouble-
some distinction between "time of commencement" and "manner of commence-
ment" suggested in Crandall v. Irwin, 139 Ohio St. 463, 40 N.E. 2d 933 (1942),
and Pilgrim Distributing Corp. v. Galsworthy, Inc., 148 Ohio St. 567, 76 N.E.
2d 382 (1947) has been abandoned, or at least that the distinction will be con-
fined to statute of limitations problems, where it is probably harmless.
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If so, the mere filing of a petition in municipal court, without more,
would not be sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
A special rule is established by the Act itself as to when an
action is commenced for the purpose of establishing lis pendens.
Section 1606 provides in part:
An action is pending so as to charge third persons with
notice of its pendency when summons has been served or
the first publication made ....
The language of this section differs from the language of the com-
mon pleas court lis pendens statute, Section 11300, in the addition
of the significant word "first" before the word "publication."
(2) Service of Summons.
Section 1603 of the General Code provides that service shall
be made in the manner provided for service in the court of com-
mon pleas. Apparently the reference to common pleas procedure
is broad enough to include Section 11297-1, authorizing courts to
provide, by rule, for service by mail, particularly in view of the
reference to the municipal court in the latter section. Mail service
is widely employed in municipal courts at present.
Section 1603 empowers the bailiff of the municipal court to
serve process within the county or counties in which the court is
situated, thus making it unnecessary to issue process to the sheriff
of the county. However, if process is to be served in another coun-
ty, it must be issued to the sheriff of that county.
(3) Pleadings.
Except for the reference to the petition in Section 1602 of the
General Code, the Act is silent on the subject of pleadings. There-
fore, under Section 1599, the statutory provisions for pleadings in
the court of common pleas would be applicable to the municipal
court. Any municipal court rule in conflict with the common pleas
statutes would be invalid. For example, existing Rule 15 of the
Municipal Court of Columbus provides that a reply shall not be
required. This local rule is inconsistent with Section 11326, pro-
viding for a reply in actions in the court of common pleas, and
would therefore probably be abrogated by Section 1599.
(4) Trial.
Except for the matter of jury trials, the Act is silent on the
subject of trial, and therefore this subject would be governed by
the statutory provisions for the court of common pleas. The Act
provides that any cause in a municipal court "shall be tried to the
court unless a jury trial be demanded in writing by a party entitled
to the same.1 7 This is similar to Rule 38 (d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and is contrary to the rule in the court of com-
17 Onmo GEN. CoDE § 1604.
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mon pleas that a party entitled to a trial by jury loses such right
only by waiver.1 8
In the enumeration of powers in Section 1596 of the General
Code, the municipal court is empowered to "grant a new trial or
motion in arrest of judgment, vacate or modify a judgment," etc.,
but is not expressly authorized to grant a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. Nevertheless, the municipal court prob-
ably has the power to grant such a motion, either by virtue of the
catch-all provision at the end of Sub-section (A), or by virtue of
the second paragraph of Section 1599, which provides that in the
absence of a special provision in the Act, "the practice and proce-
dure shall be the same as is provided for in courts of common pleas."
(5) Counterclaims.
Whenever a court is established with a maximum pecuniary
limitation upon its jurisdiction, the problem arises as to the method
of providing for counterclaims in excess of the maximum. The
problem has been handled in various ways.1 9 Under the Act, the
defendant in an action in municipal court who has a counterclaim
in excess of $2,000.00 may take one of three courses: (1) He may
counterclaim for the full amount, in which event the municipal
judge (except in the Cleveland municipal court) must certify the
proceedings in the case to the court of common pleas, pursuant to
Sub-section (E) of Section 1602 of the General Code. (2) He may
remit the excess over $2,000.00, and judgment may be entered on
his counterclaim for the residue, pursuant to the first sentence of
Sub-section (F). The sub-section does not indicate at what stage
of the case the remission may or must be made. (3) He may "at
his option, withhold setting up any statement of counterclaim and
make the same the subject of a separate action," pursuant to the
second sentence of Sub-section (F). Thus the use of the counter-
claim is permissive. The compulsory counterclaim, employed in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was not adopted in the Act.
If the defendant takes the first course, and counterclaims for
more than $2,000.00, the language of Sub-section (E), taken literal-
ly, imposes an absolute duty on the municipal judge to certify the
"proceedings in the case" to the court of common pleas. However,
the municipal court probably has the power to protect its jurisdic-
tion by refusing to certify if the defendant's claim of more than
$2,000.00 is obviously not made in good faith. Although the federal
Is Omo GiT. CODE § 11421-1.
19 For example, in the case of justices of the peace, Section 10379 of the
General Code provides that the defendant need not remit the excess of his
claim over the jurisdictional maximum, and that a recovery for any part of
the amount actually set up by the defendant shall not be a bar to his subse-
quent action for the amount over the jurisdictional maximum.
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jurisdictional statutes are similarly unqualified, the federal courts
have refused jurisdiction "if, from the face of the pleadings, it is ap-
parent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the
amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like
certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that
amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose
of conferring jurisdiction ..."20
If the case is one which should be certified under Sub-section
(E), apparently no motion by the defendant is necessary, as the
statute imposes the duty directly upon the municipal judge, and he
probably has no jurisdiction to proceed further, except to certify.
However, if the judge does not certify promptly, a written motion
to certify should be filed, to keep the record clear and to avoid con-
fusion.
Presumably the certification itself should be by docket entry.
The procedure upon certification to the court of common pleas is
set forth in Section 1602 (G) of the General Code, which provides
in general that the clerk of the municipal court shall transmit the
original papers and a certified transcript of the journal entries to
the clerk of the court of common pleas. Sub-section (G) concludes
with this sentence:
The case shall then proceed as if it has [had?] been com-
menced originally in the court of common pleas.
By this it is probably meant merely that the further proceedings
in the court of common pleas shall be in accordance with the pro-
cedure of that court. It was certainly not meant by this provision
to upset retroactively the validity or correctness of any step which
was taken in the municipal court, in accordance with the procedure
of that court, prior to certification. Thus, if plaintiff's petition in
the municipal court prayed for less than $100.01, the minimum juris-
diction of the court of common pleas, the latter court, after certifi-
cation, would nevertheless have jurisdiction of plaintiff's claim.
The court of common pleas would take the case in the condition it
was at the time of certification. If this approach is correct, it would
probably follow that if, upon the pleadings filed in municipal court,
that court would have taken judicial notice of a municipal ordi-
nance, the court of common pleas should likewise take such judicial
notice after the case is certified to it.2' This point should probably
20 St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
21 In Orose v. Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co., 132 Ohio St. 607, 9 N.E. 2d
671 (1937), the supreme court held that "an appellate court, in reviewing the
judgment of a municipal court on questions of law, may take judicial notice
of an ordinance of which the municipal court did and was entitled to take
notice." However, the certification procedure differs basically from an appeal.
It is more nearly analogous to the removal of an action from state court to
federal court.
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be clarified by an amendment. Until it is clarified by amendment
or judicial construction, the safe course will be to amend the plead-
ings in the court of common pleas so as to plead applicable munici-
pal ordinances.
The defendant may choose the third course, as described supra,
and instead of counterclaiming, bring a separate suit on his claim
against the plaintiff. One possible motive for this would be to ob-
tain a different venue for the separate suit. Another possible mo-
tive would be to delay bringing action on a personal injury claim
until the extent of the injuries could be more accurately deter-
mined. If the defendant does, for any reason, bring a separate suit,
both parties should bear in mind the possibility that the litigation
and determination of certain issues in the first action may be con-
clusive on the parties in the second action.22 As an example, we
may consider the common case of the collision of two automobiles,
one owned and operated by the plaintiff, the other owned and op-
erated by the defendant. If the issue of the negligence of the de-
fendant is litigated in the first action in municipal court, and the
court determines that the defendant was negligent, such determina-
tion would be conclusive against the defendant on that issue in the
second action.
In such a second action, the question may also arise as to
whether the plaintiff in the second action (who was the defendant
in the first action in municipal court) may recover his costs in the
subsequent action, even if successful. This question results from
the provisions of Section 11624 of the General Code.23 As Section
1602 (F) is a special provision, and unqualifiedly permits the de-
fendant to bring a separate action, the second paragraph of Section
1599 might require that the special provision be applied to the ex-
clusion of Section 11624.
(6) Attachment and Garnishment.
By reason of the second paragraph of Section 1599 of the Gen-
eral Code, the procedure for attachment and garnishment in munici-
pal court will in general conform to the statutes governing attach-
ment and garnishment in the court of common pleas.
This general rule of conformity will make applicable to munici-
22 This principle has been described as "estoppel by judgment" in Vasu v.
Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 344, 61 N.E. 2d 707 (1945). The term "collateral
estoppel" has been employed in the Restatement of Judgments (1942). A gen-
eral discussion may be found in Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56
Huv. L. REV. 1 (1942).23 This section provides in part: "If a defendant omits to set up a counter-
claim he cannot recover costs against the plaintiff in any subsequent action
thereon." A recent application of the statute may be found in Lyons, Mr., v.
Garnette, 88 Ohio App. 543, 98 NE. 2d 346 (1950), which also discusses the
estoppel by judgment principle.
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pal courts newly enacted Section 11828-1 of the General Code,2 4
requiring that a written demand be served on the debtor at least
five days before seeking an order of attachment or an order in aid
of execution against personal earnings. Such notice has previously
been required in similar proceedings before justices of the peace by
Section 10272. When, in an action in municipal court, such demand
has been made, pursuant to Section 11828-1, the further provisions
of this statute give "the judge of the municipal court within this
state in whose jurisdiction he resides" authority to appoint a trus-
tee as provided for in Section 11728-1. The procedure in connec-
tion with the trusteeship would be governed by Section 11728-1.
Although, as stated previously, the procedure for attachment
and garnishment in municipal court will in general conform to the
common pleas court procedure, Section 1602 (B) requires that in
such proceedings in municipal court, "a true copy of the affidavit
shall be served with the summons and order of attachment or gar-
nishment."
(7) Terms of Court Abolished.
An interesting and salutary reform is accomplished by Sec-
tion 1608 of the General Code, which provides:
There shall be no term in municipal court, but for the pur-
pose of computing time, ninety days following judgment
shall be considered within term and time thereafter shall be
considered after term.
Although the language of the section is not as explicit as might be
desired,25 it undoubtedly will accomplish its purpose. That pur-
pose is to allow a uniform period of ninety days within which the
party against whom a judgment has been entered may move for its
vacation or modification as if he were still "in term." It has been
fairly common practice for plaintiffs to cause the entry of judg-
ments, particularly default and cognovit judgments, to be made
near the close of a term. As a result, it is often difficult or impos-
sible for the defendant to move for vacation or modification with-
in term, and he is therefore relegated to the more rigorous pro-
cedure which must be pursued after term. Section 1608 should
prevent this tactic in municipal court.
2 4 House Bill No. 209, 99th General Assembly, effective date August 8,
1951, discussed elsewhere in this issue.
25 The phraseology of Section 452 of Title 28 of the United States Code,
and Rules 6(c) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were
drafted with a similar objective in view, seems preferable. A somewhat differ-
ent approach is taken in the federal statute and rules. They do not abolish
terms of court, but provide that the time for the taking of any proceeding,
or the power of a court to act, is not affected by the continued existence or
expiration of a term of court.
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APPFAis FRoM THE MuNicn AL CoURT IN CIvIL AcTIONS
(1) In General.
The various separate municipal court acts differed widely in
their provisions relative to appeals from such courts. This lack of
uniformity lessened the value as a precedent of a decision constru-
ing a provision of one municipal court act. It also created a con-
stitutional problem, in view of the existence of Section 11215 of the
General Code, discussed infra, in that the statutory appellate juris-
diction of the court of common pleas was not uniform throughout
the state. This possibly violated the provision of Article II, Section
26 of the Ohio Constitution, requiring that "all laws, of a general
nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the State." The
Act avoids these difficulties, as the appeal provisions are uniformly
applicable to all municipal courts throughout the state.
Section 1609 of the General Code provides in part as follows:
Appeals from the municipal court may be taken as follows:
(A) Such appeals may be taken either to the court of
common pleas or to the court of appeals as provided by sec-
tions 12223-1 to 12223-40, inclusive, and sections 13459-1 to
13459-14, inclusive, of the General Code.
The word "appeals" in Section 1609 is undoubtedly used in the
generic sense, including both (1) appeals on questions of law and
(2) appeals on questions of law and fact. The word is thus de-
fined in Section 12223-1, the first section of the Appellate Procedure
Act.
(2) Appeal on Questions of Law to The Court of Appeals.
Undoubtedly it is possible to appeal on questions of law di-
rectly from the municipal court to the court of appeals. Section
1609, quoted supra, authorizes appeals from the municipal court
to the court of appeals. However, Section 1609 is probably not self-
executing. That is, it does not, ex proprio vigore, confer jurisdic-
tion upon the court of appeals to review judgments of the munici-
pal court, pursuant to Article IV, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion, as amended effective January 1, 1945. If Section 1609 were
self-executing, this would lead to the consequence that an appeal
on questions of law and fact might always be taken from the munici-
pal court to the court of appeals, even in a non-chancery case. Such
a result was surely not intended.
However, even though Section 1609 is not self-executing, the
statutes referred to therein include Section 12223-27. That section
authorizes the court of appeals to review "a judgment rendered or
final order made by a court of common pleas, a probate court or
by any other court of record ... upon an appeal on questions of
law.... ." (Emphasis supplied.) As the municipal court is a court
of record, it would be comprehended within the terms of Section
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12223-27. Section 12223-27 is clearly self-executing. Thus an ap-
peal on questions of law from the municipal court to the court of
appeals is plainly authorized by Section 12223-27. In view of the
ample statutory basis for this mode of review, it is probably un-
necessary to consider whether the constitutional jurisdiction of the
court of appeals to review judgments of the municipal court on
questions of law, which existed prior to 1945,26 still continues.
(3) Appeal on Questions of Law and Fact to The Court of Appeals.
In the event of the trial of a chancery case in the municipal
court, it is possible to appeal directly from the municipal court to
the court of appeals on questions of law and fact, as the court of
appeals still has "appellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery
cases" as formerly provided in Article IV, Section 6 of the Ohio
Constitution.27 As stated supra, although Section 1609 should be
construed to authorize appeals on questions of law and fact, it is
probably not self-executing, and therefore could not be regarded
as the basis for this mode of review in the court of appeals. Fur-
thermore, although Section 1609 refers to Section 12223-22, relat-
ing to appeals on questions of law and fact, the latter section is
obviously not self-executing.
(4) Appeals on Questions of Law to The Court of Common Pleas.
It seems clear that it is possible to appeal to the court of com-
mon pleas on questions of law from any judgment or final order
of the municipal court. Section 12223-23 of the General Code, re-
ferred to in Section 1609, quoted supra., provides that "a judgment
rendered or final order made by a justice of the peace or any other
tribunal... inferior to the court of common pleas, may be reversed,
vacated or modified by common pleas court upon an appeal on ques-
tions of law."28 (Emphasis supplied.) Experience under the Act
will no doubt demonstrate whether it is desirable to permit appeals
on questions of law from the municipal court to the court of com-
2 6 See Cincinnati Polyclinic v. Balch, 92 Ohio St 415, 111 N.E. 159 (1915).
27 Youngstown Municipal Ry. Co. v. Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 221, 70 N.E.
2d 649 (1946) held that until the General Assembly changes the appellate
jurisdiction of the court of appeals in the trial of chancery cases, such juris-
diction remains as it was at the time of the amendment to Article IV, Section
6 of the Ohio Constitution, effective January 1, 1945. Prior to the 1945 amend-
ment the supreme court had held, in Commonwealth Oil Co. v. Turk, 118 Ohio
St. 273, 160 N.E. 856 (1928), that in a chancery case an "appeal" (which would
now be described as an "appeal on questions of law and fact") might be taken
from the municipal court to the court of appeals.
2 8 In Hess v. Devou, 112 Ohio St. 1, 146 N.E. 311 (1925) the supreme court
held that former Section 12241 of the General Code, now Section 12223-23,
conferred upon the court of common pleas jurisdiction to review judgments
of municipal courts on error, and held further that it did not violate Article
IV, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution.
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mon pleas. Although it may be a convenience to the litigants in
some cases, it adds one appeal stage, as the party who loses in the
court of common pleas may prosecute a further appeal to the court
of appeals. Such an appeal might therefore lend itself to delaying
tactics.
(5) Appeals on Questions of Law and Fact to The Court of Com-
mon Pleas.
It is not clear whether it is possible to appeal from a judgment
of the municipal court to the court of common pleas on questions
of law and fact. The bill approved by the Council of Delegates of
the Ohio State Bar Association on November 4, 195029 contained
the following provision:
Sec. 1609. Appeals from the municipal court may be taken
as follows:
(A) No appeals on questions of law and fact shall be
permitted, except in those cases where the equitable juris-
diction of the court has been invoked. An appeal on ques-
tions of law shall be taken to the court of appeals from a
final order, judgment, or decree of the municipal court as
provided by sections 12223-1 to 12223-40, inclusive of the
General Code. An appeal in a criminal case shall be taken
only to the court of appeals and the procedure shall be
governed by sections 13459-1 to 13459-14, inclusive, of the
General Code.
However, paragraph (A) of the bill was completely rewritten by
the time Substitute Senate Bill No. 14 was introduced. In the sub-
stitute bill, paragraph (A) appeared in its final form, without the
express prohibition on appeals on questions of law and fact, and
with the authorization of appeals to the court of common pleas.
The change in paragraph (A) was probably made by amendment
in the Senate, subsequent to the introduction of original Senate
Bill No. 14.
As a result of the drastic amendment of Section 1609, there is
a distinct possibility that an appeal may be taken from the munici-
pal court to the court of common pleas on questions of law and
fact. As stated supra, although Section 1609 should be construed
to authorize appeals on questions of law and fact, it is probably
not self-executing, and therefore could not be regarded as the basis
for this mode of review in the court of common pleas. However,
the statutes referred to in Section 1609 include Section 12223-22,
which provides in part that appeals on questions of law and fact
may be taken "from any court, tribunal, commission or officer to
any court of record as may be provided by law." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) This section is obviously not self-executing. However, it
is probable that the phrase, "as may be provided by law" refers,
29 Supra, note 3.
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inter alia, to Section 11215, providing for the civil jurisdiction of
the court of common pleas. The latter section provides in part:
The court of common pleas shall have... appellate jurisdic-
tion from the decision of county commissioners, justices of
the peace, and other inferior courts in the proper county,
in all civil cases, subject to the regulations provided by law.
The term "appellate jurisdiction," having been employed in the
statute prior to the Appellate Procedure Act, obviously means juris-
diction to entertain an appeal on questions of law and fact.30
The effect of Section 11215 was considered in cases arising
under certain former municipal court acts which contained no ex-
press provisions either affirming or denying the right to appeal
from the particular municipal court to the court of common pleas
on questions of law and fact. The decisions were conflicting.31 In
spite of this conflict, the question seems never to have been con-
sidered by the supreme court.32 It has been argued that the legisla-
tive history of Section 11215 indicates that it is not self-executing.33
3OThe term "appellate jurisdiction," as employed in Section 11215 of the
General Code, was so construed in Bates v. Boutelle, 68 Ohio App. 11, 38 N.E.
2d 420 (1939), and Northern Ohio Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. Givner, 32 Ohio L.
Abs. 362 (1939). The term "appellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery
cases," employed in Article IV, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution prior to
1945, was repeatedly construed to mean what would now be described as juris-
diction to review on questions of law and fact. See, e.g., Kiriakis v. Fountas,
109 Ohio St. 553, 143 N.E. 129 (1924).
31 The following cases held that there was a right to appeal from the mu-
nicipal court to the court of common pleas on questions of law and fact;
DeWolfe v. Ottgen, 71 Ohio App. 380, 50 N.E. 2d 180 (1942), originating in the
Municipal Court of Toledo; Bates v. Boutelle, supra, note 30, originating in
the Municipal Court of Steubenville; Northern Ohio Dry Cleaners, Inc. v.
Givner, supra, note 30, originating in the Municipal Court of Lorain; Wood-
ward v. Hafely, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 256 (1935), originating in the Municipal Court
of Lorain; Weber v. Eppstein, 34 Ohio App. 10, 170 N.E. 191 (1929), originating
in the Municipal Court of Canton. In Doll v. Williams, (unreported) Franklin
County Common Pleas, No. 124,755, decided February 4, 1930, originating in
the Municipal Court of Columbus, it was held that a limitation on the right
of appeal (i.e., on questions of law and fact) from the Municipal Court of
Columbus to the court of common pleas, contained in former Section 1558-75 (a)
was unconstitutional.
Other cases, all originating in the Municipal Court of Cincinnati, held that
there was no right to appeal to the court of common pleas on questions of
law and fact. Sroufe v. Guttman, 65 Ohio App. 556, 32 N.E. 2d 444 (1940);
Weaver v. Reichert, 32 N.E. 2d 422 (full opinion), 2 Ohio L. Abs. 697 (abstract-
ed opinion), motion to certify overruled November 4, 1924; Kappner v. Dolan,
23 Ohio L. Abs. 555, 8 Ohio Op. 275 (1937).32 In 1924, the supreme court overruled a motion to certify in Weaver v.
Reichert, supra, note 31, but the conflict apparently had not developed at that
time.
33 House, De Novo Appeals From Municipal Courts to Common Pleas
Courts in Ohio, 17 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 159, 36 Ohio Op. 395 (1948).
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The same writer further argues that the supreme court ignored
Section 11215 of the General Code, in Hess v. Devou, 34 because
that statute is not self-executing. As against this second conten-
tion, it may be urged that in Hess v. Devou the question before the
court was whether proceedings in error (which would now be de-
scribed as an "appeal on questions of law") could be taken from
the Municipal Court of Cincinnati to the court of common pleas.
This specific type of review was described explicitly in former Sec-
tion 12241, now Section 12223-23 of the General Code. Therefore,
there was no occasion for the supreme court to refer to Section
11215 as the term "appellate jurisdiction" in the latter section, as
has been stated supra, plainly contemplates the type of review
which would now be described as an "appeal on questions of law
and fact."
If the Act authorizes appeals on questions of law and fact from
the municipal court to the court of common pleas, this is contrary
to the general tenor of the Act, which clearly manifests an inten-
tion to create a court of record, capable of administering justice ac-
cording to the standards of the court of common pleas. It is sub-
mitted that the Act should be amended to make it clear that ap-
peals on questions of law and fact to the court of common pleas are
not permitted.
CRI1MINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT
The criminal jurisdiction of the municipal court is governed by
Sections 1584 and 1598 of the General Code. It may be outlined as
follows:
A. Final jurisdiction of:
1. The violation of any ordinance of any municipality within
its territory.
2. Any misdemeanor committed within its territory.
3. Crimes and offenses committed within the county which
are now or may hereafter be within the county wide final
jurisdiction of justices of the peace.
B. Preliminary jurisdiction of:
1. Felonies committed within its territory.
2. Crimes and offenses committed within the county which
are now or may hereafter be within the county wide pre-
liminary jurisdiction of justices of the peace.
With reference to A,3, and B,2, of the outline, supra, it is as-
sumed that the last sentence of Section 1598, conferring upon the
municipal courts county wide jurisdiction of crimes and offenses
which are within the county wide jurisdiction of justices of the
peace, contemplates both preliminary and final jurisdiction. In that
3 4 Supra, note 28.
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connection, it should be noted that the general statute providing for
the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in criminal matters35 confers
county wide preliminary jurisdiction on the justice of the peace only
upon affidavit filed by certain persons and officers, and only "in
the event there is no other court of concurrent juisdiction other than
the common pleas court, police court or mayor's court." The At-
torney General has ruled that a municipal court is a "court of con-
current jurisdiction" within the meaning of this statute.36 There-
fore, the extent of the preliminary criminal jurisdiction of the muni-
cipal court (B,2, of the outline, supra) is problematical. Such pro-
visions in old municipal court acts as former Section 1558-55 (a),
limiting the county wide jurisdiction of justices of the peace and
mayors in Franklin County, were repealed by Section 2 of the Act.
The first paragraph of Section 1584 terminates the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace only within the territory of the municipal
court.
Apparently the final and preliminary jurisdiction of the munici-
pal court outside its territory (A,3, and B,2, of the outline, supra)
is concurrent with that of justices of the peace, and not exclusive
thereof.
Apparently the municipal court does not have final jurisdic-
tion of the violation of an ordinance of any municipality outside its
territory. Furthermore, although it does have final jurisdiction of
the violation of any ordinance of any municipality within its ter-
ritory (A,1, of the outline, supra), such jurisdiction is not exclusive.
The second sentence of Section 1584 of the General Code, inserted
by amendment, provides:
All other mayors within the territory may retain such jur-
isdiction as now provided in all criminal causes involving
violation of ordinances of their respective municipalities to
be exercised concurrently with the municipal court.
This leaves to such municipalities the power to provide for prompt
local enforcement of their own ordinances, instead of compelling
them to resort to the sometimes distant and inconvenient munici-
pal court.
It would seem that mayors have county wide final jurisdic-
tion of misdemeanors committed outside the territory of the munici-
pal court.3 7 It may also be contended that mayors still have coun-
3S Ono GEN. CODE § 13422-2.
361937 Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. (Ohio) No. 1652.
3 7Sections 4528 and 4536 of the General Code confer on mayors county
wide final jurisdiction of prosecutions for misdemeanors. As stated in the
text, supra, such provisions in old municipal court acts as former Section 1558-
55(a) of the General Code, limiting the jurisdiction of justices of the peace
and mayors in Franklin County, were repealed by Section 2 of the Act. The
first sentence of Section 1584 terminates the jurisdiction of the mayor and
the police justice only "within the municipality in which such municipal court
is located."
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ty wide final jurisdiction of misdemeanors committed within the
territory of the municipal court, but outside the municipality in
which such court is located. Although the Act gives the municipal
court final jurisdiction of such misdemeanors (A,2, of the outline,
supra), it does not terminate the jurisdiction of mayors in that
area. Therefore, there may be concurrent jurisdiction between the
municipal court and the mayors as to misdemeanors committed in
that area.
Likewise, police courts probably have final jurisdiction of mis-
demeanors committed within a limited area38 and therefore the
foregoing discussion would also apply to them, to some extent.
CRnvMAL PROCEDURE IN THE MUNIPAL COURT
The criminal practice and procedure in the municipal court is
governed by the first paragraph of Section 1599 of the General
Code. Unlike civil actions, the Act contains no provisions directly
prescribing the procedure in criminal cases in the municipal court.
Instead, such procedure is completely prescribed by reference to
criminal procedure in other courts. (1) The basic reference is to
police courts, Section 1599 providing that the procedure in criminal
cases in the municipal court shall be the same as in police courts.
(2) "If no practice or procedure is provided for police courts, then
the practice or procedure of mayor's courts shall apply." (3) If
there is no provision for either of the foregoing, "then the practice
or procedure of justice of the peace courts shall apply." This "in-
corporation by reference" was probably advisable in the Act. How-
ever, experience under the Act may indicate the desirability of a
complete, self-contained system of criminal procedure for the muni-
cipal court.
38 Omo GEN. CoDE § 4577.
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